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0 F THE STATE 0'F UTAH
1

1

JAMES P. KNUCKLES,
Plaintiff-Respondent.
vs.
METROPOLITAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
12254

REPLY BRIEF 0'F APPELLANT'
STATEMENT OF FACTS
So that there may not exist any misconception about
the contents of the record below, defendant-appellant
will address itself to certain factual assertions of plaintiffappellee.
In his brief, plaintiff-appellee would infer categorically that plaintiff cannot wear a contact lens comfortably without irritation. (See Brief of Appellee at 5, 16.)
Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Rowland H. Merrill at
the instance of defendant and the contact lens prescribed
for plaintiff was examined and measured by a contact
lens manufacturer in Salt Lake City, Utah, at the instance
1
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of Doctor Merrill. At trial Doctor Merrill testified as
follows concerning the results of that examination:

Q. Thank you. Now, Doctor, have you ever
treated a patient for cataract removal?
A. Cataract is a very common condition and
I have done hundreds of operations for cataracts
and fitted them after to improve that vision with
either glasses or contact lens.

Q. Would you explain to the Court what
your treatment normally consists?
A. After the operation for the cataract, we
usually wait anywhere from one month to three
or four months before we prescribe glasses. Now
it depends on the patient, upon his vision whether
we prescribe glasses or contact lens. The vast ma·
jority of people involved who have had cataract
operations and have had experience with contact
lens and glasses prefer the contact lens to the
glasses. Because their vision is better, they have
a wider field of vision and their vision is more
normal.

Q.

Is the standard procedure among mem·
hers of your profession to fit people who have
suffered the loss of lens with a contact lens?
A. Here again it depends upon the patient,
the age of the patient, some people are so shak·
ing [sic] that they can't put a contact lens in the
eye. And yet I have people over eighty who sue·
cesfully wear contact lenses and the majority of
people as I said before prefer contact lenses and
we usually fit contact lenses unless there is some
specific reason why we shouldn't fit a contact lens.
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Q. The patients that you have treated for
cataract removal, have they adjusted well to the
use of the contact lens?
A. The vast majority of people do because
when we operate on a cataract we cut the eye
half open. Across the top. That destroys all the
nerve fibers that go down to the cornea. Some
of which degenerate, the majority of which do not
regenerate, so the eye is less sensitive after an
operation for cataract that it is before an operation for cataract. These people usually tolerate
contact lenses very well because as I say, their
vision is improved. Their sensitivity of the cornea
is reduced and they make ideal patients.

Q. How did you have occasion to examine
the plaintiff, Mr. Knuckles?
A. Yes, I examined Mr. Knuckles on June
22d, 1970, in my office in Salt Lake City.

Q.

Of what did your examination consist?

A. Well, my examination consisted of the
internal examination which revealed that the patieq.t was aphakic. Aphakia means the lens of
the eye has been removed. It also revealed the
fact that the patient had had an operation for a
muscle imbalance. And it revealed that his field
was normal and his vision with the contact lens
which he was wearing, was twenty, twenty-five
minus one or two letters.

Q. Now you mentioned that Mr. Knuckles
was wearing his contact lens, is that correct?
A. He was wearing the contact lens when
he came into the office.

Q.

Now you were here in this court. this
morning and you heard Mr. Knuckles complam of

3
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his difficulty in wearing the contact lens. On the
basis of your examination of Mr. Knuckles and
of his lens, do you have an opinion concerning
the cause of his discomfort?
A. The comfort in wearing the contact lens
depends upon several factors. One is the motivation of the patient. Another is the eye sensitivity
of the patient. And thirdly, it depends upon the
fit of the contact lens itself. Now this contact
lens of Mr. Knuckles I had examined by one of
our contact lens makers in Salt Lake City. He
revealed that the lens had bad edges. By bad
edges we mean the edges are not smooth and they
were rough. There was no bevel of the contact
lens. It was a large lens, a lens which ordinarily
I would expect to be an uncomfortable lens. With
some improvement in the grinding of the lens I
think the lens could be made much more accep·
table to the patient. More tolerable.

Q. Now, Dr. Merrill, assuming that Mr.
Knuckles was fitted with a smaller and properly
fitting contact lens and based on your examina·
tion of Mr. Knuckles and your experience with
other patients who are using cataract, I mean using
contacts with cataract operations, do you have an
opinion within a reasonable degree of medical
certainty whether or not the plaintiff should be
able to wear contact lenses comfortably?
A. I think if the patient wanted to wear the
lens, if it were perfectly fitted lens, smooth, well·
machined and not too heavy, he could wear it
comfortably.
(T r. a t 32 - 35 . ) Thus , the undisputed evidence in the
record is that plaintiff could wear a modern, properly
fitting lens comfortably if he wanted to. Moreover, the
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evidence is also uncontroverted that with normal glasses
alone and without a contact lens, plaintiff still had a
visual acuity of 20/20 or normal vision. (Letter dated
April 24, 1967, from James P. Rigg, Sr., M.D. to James
Alexander, M.D., marked as Exhibit I to and identified in
the deposition of James P. Rigg, Sr. at 29.) Therefore,
any alleged discomfort of plaintiff was respect to the
contact lens can be remedied and there is absolutely no
evidence to demonstrate that plaintiff belongs to that
small minority of people who for some reason do not
adjust to contact lenses. Dr. Merrill testified that he
could not recall a single cataract patient of his that did
not adjust well to a contact lens. (Tr. at 36.) Even if
plaintiff did belong to that small minority of people who
cannot wear contact lenses, his vision could be 20/20
with normal glasses. The issue on appeal remains the
same - whether or not under the terms of the insurance
policy corrective lenses of any type must be considered.
Also, mention should be made of the fact that plaintiff failed to inform his own doctor about any categorical
or inherent difficulty in wearing his contact lens. In the
deposition of Robert W. Rigg, M.D., the physician who
prescribed the contact lens, the following statements are
found:

Q. Has he ever expressed to you, as far as
your recollection or your notes would indicate, any
particular problem in wearing the lens?
A. He related one specific instance I wrote
down here, when he said he couldn't wear it at
work. I presume because of the work he was
doing. It probably got dust and dirt and such
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under the contact. I don't even know whether
he's wearing it now; but he has at times worn it
and worn it quite well.

Q. What makes you say that he has at times
worn it and worn it well?
A. Well, because he's related that he has
been able to wear it at times. In other words, well, or that he hasn't. For instance in November
of '68, he mentioned according to him that he was
not wearing his contact because of his work. And,
actually, I'm not even sure how much he had been
wearing it successfully because I have no specific
references as to what his total hours of unwearing
have been. I've only seen him twice since his last
muscle surgery on his eye; so I really can't say
that I could speak with any authenticity as to
how much he's wearing it because he might be
wearing it all the time and he might not. I don't
know today what he's been doing.

Q. So, he hasn't indicated to you one way
or the other?
A.

I have not seen him.

(Deposition of Dr. Robert W. Rigg at 13.)
It would seem that if plaintiff actually had great diffi·
culty in wearing the lens during his off duty hours and
if he really was concerned about improving his vision, he
would have indicated his alleged problems in wearing
the lens to his physician sometime between 1968 and the
date of trial. In plaintiff's own deposition taken before
trial, he again failed to mention that he could not wear
the lens outside of his place of employment:
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lens?

Q.

When were you fitted with the contact

A. Let's see, that's been I think about the
last part of '68.

Q.

How often do you wear it?

A. Well, I can't wear it down to the mine.
And usually when I get home it's a bother to put
it on just for a few minutes. So I get it out on
my days off and wear it a lot of time and try to
get used to wearing it. When I have a lot of time.
(Deposition of plaintiff at 32.)
Here, plaintiff says nothing about irritation, only that
the lens is a "bother" to put on. He even stated that "he
wears it a lot of time." Dr. Merrill testified that plaintiff should be able to adjust to the contact lens during
his off duty hours so that he could wear the lens comfortaby. (Tr. at 35-36.) In sum, the evidence would indicate that plaintiff might have been exaggerating his discomfort with the lens at trial. Any real discomfort can
be explained on the basis of the defects in the lens diagnosed pursuant to Doctor Merrill's examination. In any
event, plaintiff's ability or inability to wear a contact
lens comfortably did not enter into the lower court's de- ·
termination. (Paragraph 3 of Order dated September
14, 1970.)
Plaintiff-appellee also makes the assertion that the
prognosis for the life of plaintiff's injured eye is 10 years.
(Brief of Appellee at 16.) There is absolutely no basis

7
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in the record relative to plaintiff's injury that would support the conclusion that the expected life of plaintiff's
eye is 10 years. The basis for plaintiff's assertion is probably the following statements by Dr. Robert W. Rigg:

Q. With a man the age of Mr. Knuckles, is
there any possibility that he'll outlive that eye?
A. It's been reported that the average age
of a cataract, an eye that has had a cataract removed, is about ten years. They are more prone
to have retinal detachment and other conditions
of their eye than the average eye, than a normal
eye, I should say.

Q. What is this statistic of ten years that
you mentioned?
A. This has been quoted. That's all. But,
some go along fine for a long period of time and
some don't. Some of this also relates to the initial
injury, as to how severe it was and what was the
original problem.
(Deposition of Robert W. Rigg at 19-20.) This state·
ment is in no way connected to plaintiff's injury, nor is
the source of the alleged report given, nor is the opinion
offered as the concerted opinion of Doctor Rigg. Cer·
tainly, if plaintiff at some later date does in fact suffer
the total and irrecoverable loss of sight as feared, then is
when a claim should be brought under this policy.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CASES CITED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE ARE NOT IN POINT.
Plaintiff-appellee has failed to cite one case that is
m point to the facts and issues presented in this case.
There is only one case cited in appellee' s brief that was
concerned with a policy containing the language identical with the language of the insurance policy in this
case. And in that case, Clark v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co.,
43 Cal. App.2d 563, 111 P.2d 354, reh. denied 43 Cal.
App. 2d 563, 112 P.2d 298 (1941), the plaintiff suffered
a detached retina and there is no evidence that any medical procedures could ever rectify plaintiff's sight. All of
the remaining decisions cited by appellee either construe
policies which require only the "entire loss of sight" and
not the "total and irrecoverable loss of sight," or interpret work.mens compensation decisions which do not apply to the facts of this case.
Appelle relies on various workmens compensation
decisions which stand for the proposition that artificial
lenses do not change the permanent character of the injury to the claimant and can therefore be disregarded.
However, the issue in this case is not whether plaintiff's
loss of sight is permanent, but whether plaintiff's sight
is total and cannot be recovered, remedied or rectified.
As indicated in Wallace v. Insurance Company of North
America, 415 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1969), the word "permanent" as used in a Kentucky workmens compensation

9
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statute did not imply an attempt to recover sight as did
the term "irrecoverable" as used in the applicable insurance contract. It is inconceivable that the use of corrective lenses could be disregarded in determining the
issue of the extent of the recovery of sight.
Appellee argues by analogy to a situation in which a
claimant has lost a limb and thereafter is fitted with an
artificial appliance. It is asserted that the artificial appliance itself, like the lenses in this case, points up the
fact of the loss and the permanency of the injury. Appellant does not argue that there was a loss and that
the loss without surgery and corrective lenses would be
permanent. Nevertheless, the issue in this case is whether this loss has been rectified by surgery and corrective
lenses. The facts of this case are more appropriately analagous to a situation in which a person suffered an injury
to an arm or a leg, causing a temporary diminution in
the use of said limb, but which could be entirely rectified
through the use of a steel pin or an unobtrusive brace.
Certainly, in this type of situation, there would be no
grounds for recovery under an insurance policy which insured against the severance of an arm or a leg at a par·
ticular point or even against the total and irrecoverable
loss of use. It is incongruous to speak in terms of total
and irrecoverable loss of use if the subject limb were
capable of normal function. The language cited by the
court in Southland Life Insurance Company v. Dunn, 71
S.W.2d 1103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) is applicable:
One who sustains a broken arm suffers the
loss of the use of such arm. If proper treatment
10
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be not had, such loss may become irrecoverable
but no one would contend that a mere broke~
arm ordinarily constitutes an entire and irrecoverable loss of its use.
We can see no valid reason why one who has
suffered he entire loss of sight by cataracts on his
eyes is not governed by the same considerations.
The evidence is certainly sufficient to raise an issue as to whether an ordinarily prudent person
under such circumstances would undergo an operation for removal of the cataracts. The evidence
also shows the loss of sight may be restored or
substantially improved. In the one event the loss
sight would be recovered; in the other event it
would be partially recovered, thus creating a partial rather than a complete disability.
In either event the plaintiff in this case could
not recover because under the terms of the policy
the loss of sight in both eyes must be "entire and
irrecoverable.''
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff has not suffered the total and irrecoverable loss of sight in one eye within the meaning of the
policy. Through surgery and the use of modern corrective lenses, plaintiff has indeed recovered the sight lost
resulting from his unfortunate injury. The cases cited
by plaintiff-appellee are not applicable to the legal issues
presented in this case. This Court should avoid the result
warned against in the case cited by plaintiff-appellee of
Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United
States, 94 Utah 532, 544, 72 P.2d 1060, 1065-66 (1937):
But the cases annotated in this same note show
that by a process of judicial erosion the courts have
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in many cases so "liberalized" the language of the
policy as to extend it beyond what was fairly
within its terms.
In Cato v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 164 Ga. 392,
138 S.E. 787, at page 790, it is stated:
Policies of insurance will be liberally
construed in favor of the object to be accom.
plished, and provisions therein will be strictly
construed against the insurer.
But the
contract of insurance should be construed so
as to carry out the true intention of the parties.
The rights of the parties are to
be determined by the terms of the policy, so
far as they are lawful. The language of the
contract should be construed as a whole, and
should receive a reasonable construction, and
not be extended beyond what is fairly within
the terms of the policy. Where the language
is unambiguous and but one reasonable construction of the contract is possible, the court
must expound it as made."

***

***

The decision of the trial court should be reversed,
with orders that defendant-appellant is entitled to a judgment against plaintiff dismissing the action with prejudice
as requested in defendant's Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORN\-V ALL & McCARTHY
Leonard J. Lewis
Roger H. Thompson
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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